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Having just written a book entitled Government andInformation published by Tottel Publishing it mayappear a little strange to juxtapose that title with
the limits of law’s empire. Even the most perfunctory
examination of the book will reveal a mass of legal duties
and obligations in relation to information. That’s why I
first wrote it over 15 years ago. It followed on from another
work I had written on Freedom of Information: the Law, the
Practice and the Ideal (now 3rd ed, 2001) which is an
academic monograph. I was informed by the secretary to
the Hutton Inquiry that Freedom is standard introductory
fare for civil servants coming into freedom of information.
This article’s title addresses the relationship between
government and information and the use of laws and other
constraints to regulate access to information and
protection of information. I want to explore the extent and
limits of law in making government more open, more
transparent. We have a Freedom of Information Act, Data
Protection Act, Access to Environmental Information
Regulations and most recently the Re-use of Public Sector
Information Regulations (EIR). Public Records legislation
has existed since the 1950s. Thousands of legal provisions
provide for access to information or secrecy: sometimes
both. Over 50 states have FoI legislation (including
Zimbabwe – an act which I am informed is really a control
of the press act: McDonald 2006). The EU has provisions
based on a Treaty article and a regulation and not purely
internal rules of procedure. The EU constitution would
have strengthened the access provisions making them both
constitutional and fundamental rights. Indeed, FoI has
become a global pre-occupation but we do not have global
FoI laws.
We seem to have a constant obsession in the UK with
abuse by government of its powers. There have been
Thatcher’s excesses, the Judge over your Shoulder (1987)
written in a churlish tone to advise civil servants on how to
make their behaviour judicial review proof, and Blair’s war
and his obsession over the information and publicity
machine at the heart of government leading to three
inquiries into government’s use of intelligence, officials
and communications within 12 months (Hatton HC 247
(2003–04) Butler Cm 6942 and Phillis 2004 (Birkinshaw
2005 ch.2)). FoI was a means of bringing government
closer to the people and Blair’s government published
their plans in December 1997. The story of what followed
has been described elsewhere (Birkinshaw 2001 and 2005,
Birkinshaw and Parkin 1999). And yet, despite a
proliferation of access laws throughout the world, there has
been an increased tendency to secrecy in the USA and in
the UK – most evident in homeland security and the war
on terror.
The worldwide experience of FoI laws is not always
positive. I am an author of one of the essays in a stimulating
book edited by Christopher Hood on Transparency to be
published under the auspices of the British Academy in
2006. In the company of very distinguished social
scientists, philosophers and public servants I am the sole
lawyer. In his concluding chapter Hood emphasises that
Birkinshaw alone makes the case for access to information
as a human right. The image came to mind of some star
gazing, wild-eyed libertarian – irresponsible and naïve. A
good deal of criticism if not scepticism suffuses some of the
essays in their analysis of the phenomenon of transparency
and its modern instantiations.
The tone was set recently by Onora O’Neil in her Reith
lectures in 2002 on A Question of Trust where she argues that
our addiction to transparency has undermined important
values such as trust, responsibility and true accountability.
The removal of the mystery of judicial appointments by
detailed regulation in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
would probably meet with her disapproval. (I must say that
I see something very worrying in the assurance in s1 of that
Act that nothing in the statute adversely affects the rule of
law!). For others, an insistence on openness and access to
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information is self-defeating. As Jean Jacques Rousseau
(quoted in Hood 2006) expressed the point:
‘Books and auditing of accounts, instead of exposing frauds,
only conceal them; for prudence is never so ready to conceive
new precautions as knavery is to elude them.’
I have never made the case for access to information as
an unqualified human right. Of course there are justifiable
limits to access to government held information. But I
remain a firm believer in FoI laws and I argue elsewhere
that freedom of information is a human right (Birkinshaw
in Hood (2006) and Administrative Law Review (2006)
forthcoming). The problem is the old constitutional
conundrum. Who decides on who decides: in this context
where the limit on FoI is?
The thesis is that governmental power is ultimately in its
most important reaches not subject to effective legal
constraint. It is simply beyond law’s empire. Had the
decision of the Court of Appeal (A etc v Secretary of State
[2004] EWCA Civ 1123) allowing information allegedly
extracted by torture to be used by the Home Secretary not
been reversed by the Law Lords, there would have been
little effective restraint on how the government obtains and
uses information for intelligence provided it was obtained
without use of British officials overseas. The Law Lords
have at least ruled such evidence inadmissible in judicial
proceedings ([2005] UKHL 71).
Quite what impact this will have on intelligence
gathering we will have to wait and see. But there is a two-
handled dimension to this: government may not be able to
use the law to protect its secrets when that need for secrecy
is felt to be at its greatest. This is vividly illustrated by the
acquittal of Clive Ponting over 20 years ago, an acquittal
that led to the reform of the 1911 Official Secrets Act and
the replacement of the blunderbuss with the armalite when
a jury refused to convict as enjoined by the trial judge,
Attorney General and members of the government.
The jury saw its constitutional duty in acquittal. It was
graphically illustrated in 2004 by the powerlessness of the
Attorney General to initiate criminal proceedings to punish
Clare Short and a junior official over leaks concerning
bugging and tapping activities of British intelligence
services at the UN HQ.
I shall concentrate on the following points:
1. The structure of the FoIA.
2. The war on terrorism
3. International and diplomatic relationships
4. Illegitimate use of privacy
5. Commercial secrecy and the public interest
6. Access to information and openness as a human right
7. Information and legal argument
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FOI
Before that, allow me briefly to describe the information
society that we have become. We are all familiar with the
litany of benedictions concerning the bright side of FoI in
domestic and EU laws. Here is one example from Europe:
The evolution towards an information and knowledge society
influences the life of every citizen in the Community .. by
enabling them to gain new ways of accessing and acquiring
knowledge. (Directive 2003/98/EC Re-use of Public
Sector Information).
Let me start by saying that the experience of FoIA UK so
far has very promising features although the delays by some
public authorities in responding to requests are worrying.
The decision in relation to fees was a good one in
stipulating that up to limits (£600 for central government,
£450 otherwise) fees will not be charged for information.
The right is a right to information, but where access to
documents is the best way of fulfilling this right, provision
of documents should be allowed. The public interest test is
weighted in favour of disclosure. One hundred thousand
public authorities are covered including Parliament. The
Act (which came into effect on January 1, 2005) is fully
retrospective. The Act is not so generous in its protection
of classes of information and the test of prejudice or damage
to withhold specific information is not as generous as the
Scottish legislation which opted for “substantial prejudice”
in most cases.
The Government refused to impose a duty on
authorities to provide indexes of documents held but we
now have publication schemes and inforoute provides direct
access to the Government’s Information Asset Register
(IAR). The Office of e-Envoy states that:
“The IAR lists information resources held by the UK
Government, concentrating on unpublished resources. In
doing so it enables users to identify, from one single source,
the information held in a wide variety of government
departments, agencies and other organisations. Inforoute is a
key part of the Government’s agenda for freeing up access to
official information.”
Under the 2005 Re-use Regs, public authorities (PAs)
are encouraged to produce IARs to comply with that
regulation which seeks to facilitate use of public sector
information by private bodies. An information asset is any
information item that a public sector body produces that is
of interest or value to the organisation itself, and potentially
to others.
There is a fever of activity and proliferation of
consultancies concerning FoI. A great deal that has come
to pass is constructive and McDonald has set this out in a
paper in Hood’s book (McDonald, 2006). We are
bombarded by information: Performance Indicators;
statistics; publication schemes; an Information
Commissioner and Tribunal, Information officers, Office
of Public Sector Information; National Archives, National4
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Statistics and in most cases devolved analogues.
Communications technology has increased the pressure for
open source. It is calculated that there are nine million
pages of UK government domain (.gov.uk) (Margetts
(2006).
With the development of so much information and
communications technology (ICT) the spectre has grown
of intellectual property rights and the pretence of using
copyright protection to avoid FoIA. The Department for
Constitutional Affairs (DCA) guidance on disclosure and
copyright is correct but incomplete and misleading. But
the Copyright etc Act 1988 is quite clear. Section 47
exempts from copyright “material” open to public
inspection pursuant to a statutory requirement (arguably
FoIA) which contains factual information. It contains a
good many other provisions protecting such material from
copyright infringement. Section 50 Copyright etc Act
concerns acts done under statutory authority: “Where the
doing of a particular act is specifically authorised by an Act
of Parliament, whenever passed, then, unless the Act
provides otherwise, the doing of that act does not infringe
copyright” (s50(1)). FoIA does not provide otherwise and
specifically authorises disclosure. In short, this provision
covers documents held by public authorities or produced
by public sector employees in and for their employment
even where the copyright is sold to another body.
One brief example of the improved culture concerns a
body that I have worked with for five years. Nirex UK is a
company owned by government that advises on the
disposal of nuclear waste. Since 1999 it has engaged in
efforts to improve transparency and access to information
leading recently to the naming of 12 former possible sites
suitable for deep disposal of nuclear waste – actually the
original list was 537! For several years government policy
had been against disclosure of this list. The Nirex
transparency panel – established under Nirex’s
transparency policy to hear complaints against refusal of
requests for access to documents under the Nirex code on
access to documents – had in successive years
recommended disclosure of this list. In the spring of 2005,
Nirex released the information. Nirex released the list in a
managed and responsible fashion after an EIR request. The
views of the transparency panel had a pronounced impact
and a great deal more information beyond the site list was
published.
I must return to my list of problem areas.
1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOIA
McDonald has said that FoIA was not giving answers like
a Finance Act which stipulates rates of tax: it was providing
new rules on how the citizen/state relationship was to be
conducted (McDonald 2006). Until 2005, there had been
a statute for local government; non-binding codes existed
for central government and health bodies supervised by the
Ombudsman (HC 59 and 61 (2005-06)). In relation to
central government there had been worrying tendencies
not to disclose information despite recommendations for
disclosure by the Parliamentary Ombudsman – particularly
in the Cabinet Office and DCA. When the FoI Bill came it
was structured around Data Protection legislation and the
select committee which I advised was committed to
persuading government to elide provisions that were
unsuited to FoIA. In some cases the Committee was
successful. A veto exists in section 53 to overrule the
Information Commissioner’s notices on access – a
promise was given that a veto would be exercised after a
collective decision by the Cabinet and not by a single
Ministerial veto. The precedent for a collective veto came
from New Zealand where after that safeguard was
introduced no vetoes were issued. On the day FoIA came
into effect (1 January 2005) Lord Falconer promised that
the power of veto would be rarely used– it would be “very
very exceptional”. Judicial review is the only means of
challenging a veto.
Some limits in FoI practice are extra-statutory. A
clearing house has been established in the DCA to achieve
consistent responses and provide guidance on difficult
cases. Some see otherwise and have noted the tendency for
centralised control to slow down response times. There is
an informal agreement between the Information
Commissioner and DCA on how to handle sensitive
information and which appears to limit the IC’s access to
information after a section 50 notice where access by the
IC “is not necessary” (para 12). There are eight absolute
exemptions – understandable in most cases because the
information is available by other means or disclosure is
prohibited by law although I shall say more about security
in a moment. The breadth of some of the ordinary
exemptions including criminal investigations and law
enforcement (ss.30 and 31) and commercial interests is
staggering but these are subject to public interest tests.
Other provisions of the legislation denying access
especially in the policy making process (s 35) and
disclosure which would otherwise prejudice the effective
conduct of public affairs (s 36) have the potential to retain
maximum secrecy for the governmental process. It
reminds one of the words of Lord Wilberforce in earlier
litigation who deplored the criticism “of the inner
workings of government while forming important
governmental policy” by otherwise ill-informed members
of the public (Burmah Oil v Bank of England [1979] 3 All ER
700 at 707g). The world has moved on from almost 30
years ago although the sensitivity of government has not, it
seems.
THE WAR ON TERRORISM
FoIA excludes the secret intelligence and security services
from its provisions. Information supplied by or relating to
these bodies in the possession of other public authorities is
given an absolute exemption. Decisions on national
security exemptions are challengeable by appeal to the 5





information tribunal. At the EU level the use of security
classifications has been notable as a means of exclusion
from access and for the non-registration of documents in
otherwise publicly accessible registers.
Information may be withheld indirectly and not simply
by refusing access to information. This is achieved by
denying any opportunities for challenge to decisions
concerning others’ rights or liberties. The emphasis here is
on secretive processes. Some examples of secrecy have
included: the legal black hole of Guantanemo as Lord Steyn
and Lord Phillips described it whereby the US government
sought to remove from the jurisdiction of US civil courts
the cases of those imprisoned on US owned property in
Cuba. The question of the powers of detention by US and
British authorities was raised; the detentions involved those
held by the Americans at Guantanemo and also US citizens
held under military powers in the USA. In the case of
Britain, the detentions concerned those under the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, section 23 in the
UK, and detentions (of Iraqis – one at least being also a
British national) by occupying forces in Iraq. In the USA
the notorious pictures of enforced bestial and simulated
sodomy by prisoners under the constraint of US forces
were published after US FoI requests.
In terms of detention the differences between the two
jurisdictions is stark. In the USA, while habeas corpus was
applicable to challenge detentions under US legislation
both by American citizens and aliens (a Bill has passed the
Senate to reverse the latter), the Supreme Court has ruled
by majority that there is little the courts can do – even if it
means formulating the executive’s case for detention in the
absence of reasons by the executive because of the
inadequacy of the grounds put forward by the executive.
This was deprecated by Scalia J who while he portrayed a
common law fundamentalism leaning heavily on old
English as well as US precedents in rejecting the
President’s case for detention nonetheless drew a
distinction between aliens and US citizens and their
respective protection under US law. (Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542
US 507; Padilla 72 USLW 4584 and USCA 9/9/05 and
Rasul v Bush 72 USLW 4576). This should be compared
with the decision in A v Secretary of State (Belmarsh) where
the case for detention was rejected overwhelmingly by the
House of Lords and where drawing a distinction between
nationals and aliens was unlawful under the Human Rights
Act (HRA). I say more about A below. It was also the
occasion when the Attorney General labelled judicial
intervention in such matters as “undemocratic” a criticism
roundly rebutted by Lord Bingham ([2004] UKHL 56 para
42).
A critical development in the US was the post 9/11
revision of FoIA by the Homeland Security Act and Critical
Infrastructure Information Act covering much of relevance
(but not all) to recent hurricanes and the ill-prepared state
of authorities and contractors. Before that revision, the
emphasis on secrecy had been seen by the US Attorney
General’s memo in 2000 advising departments and
agencies on FoIA requests and a presumption of non
disclosure rather than disclosure as in Clinton’s
administration. There were also the revised Presidential
executive orders classifying and reclassifying information as
secret. In the UK, the cause celebre was the refusal to
publish the full story behind the UK Attorney General’s
advice on the legality of the Iraq war. After a leak to the
press, the government released the advice which only
raised further questions about the full context of the advice
and which led to further appeals to the IC.
The use of special advocates by the UK in deportation
appeals and their spread to non-terrorist if serious
criminals (Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45) has
witnessed erosion of procedural protection for those
suspected of terrorist connections and the procedure now
covers the Parole Board. A specially appointed and vetted
advocate would represent the appellant before the Special
Immigration Appeal Commission (SIAC) or the Parole
Board, in the absence of the appellant and his legal
representatives, at a closed hearing before the tribunal.
Lord Bingham continues and I quote extracts from his
judgment:
‘The Board will receive and be free to act on material adverse
to the appellant which will not, even in an anonymised or
summarised form, be made available to him or his legal
representatives. Both he and his legal representatives will be
excluded from the hearing when such evidence is given or
adduced .. The Parole Board assert that the specially
appointed advocate may call witnesses. This was not, however,
the understanding of the House of Commons Constitutional
Affairs Committee (HC 323-I (2004–05) para 52(iii)).
But even if a specially appointed advocate is free to call
witnesses, it is hard to see how he can know who to call or
what to ask if he cannot take instructions from the appellant
or divulge any of the sensitive material to the witness…. In
the vivid language used by Lord Hewart CJ …. the specially-
appointed advocate would inevitably be “taking blind shots at
a hidden target”.’ (Para 18)
Lord Bingham found the procedure in the case of the
Parole Board infringed the common law of natural justice
and Convention jurisprudence and was unlawful. Together
with Lord Steyn they formed the dissenting minority
judgments.
The possible extension of the special advocate
procedure to public interest immunity claims in criminal
cases was discussed in R v H ([2004] 1 All ER 1269). The
“problem” of public interest immunity was one that
emerged from the overruling of the House of Lords
judgment of Duncan v Cammel Laird (1942) in Conway v
Rimmer (1968). In Conway, the judges for the first time
ruled that they could look behind a certificate, ministerial
or otherwise, claiming immunity for documents. We were
witnessing the development of the law of Public Interest
Immunity in civil litigation – one of the less celebrated6
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progenitors of modern English administrative law and a
central feature in the Dual Use Equipment for Iraq (HC 115
(1995-96) inquiry nearly ten years ago. In Conway, the Law
Lords refused to accept the ipse dixit of the responsible
officer who wished to prevent the adversary in litigation
gaining access to documents in his authority’s possession
or where a responsible official wished to resist disclosure
which it was alleged would otherwise be against the public
interest (Birkinshaw 2005, ch 10). The plea is common
now in criminal trials and a recent statement from the
Attorney General to prosecutors has criticised the plea’s
excessive use by defence lawyers in such trials.
In terms of secreting processes, the following is
instructive. The “shoot to kill” policy put to dramatic use
in London in the summer of 2005 was not discussed with
the police authority; nor was it discussed in Cabinet but
only with a few senior Ministers. (Lord Stevens former
Metropolitan Police Commissioner 19/9/05 Radio 4 Today
Programme interview with John Humphries). The obsession
with security is understandable. But is it necessary to have
secretive processes of government in which life or death
policies are not even discussed at Cabinet level? It is a
throw-back to an age old and disreputable tradition.
3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The problems here are multi-dimensional but I
concentrate on two. The absence of global provisions on
access to information and the secrecy and sensitivity of
diplomatic relationships. Secondly, the confusion of
national and international legal standards and regimes.
Arguments for transparency in world affairs have an
ancient and distinguished lineage. These include Kant’s
arguments against secret treaties in Towards Perpetual Peace
(1795); Woodrow Wilson who wished for “open covenants
of peace openly arrived at with no secret international
agreements in the future”. Negotiations, he noted, would
be in private, however. I have argued elsewhere for global
transparency (McCloud and Parkinson 2006). Specific
treaties may provide information on GATT/WTO, nuclear
non-proliferation, environmental pollution, torture and
child labour. A leading example is the Århus Convention
(Cm 4736) concerning access to environmental
information, participation in environmental decision
making and access to justice which has been implemented
into domestic law by SI 3391/2004 (and Scottish
equivalent). A common position on a regulation covering
access to environmental information held by EU
institutions has been agreed (2005/OJC 264 E/18:
25/10/2005).
But companies (transnational corporations) and NGOs
operate in global markets where there are inadequate rights
of access to information internationally (the UN itself has
no such law) or, in many cases, domestically. Al Roberts has
shown how US influence in NATO has forced Official
Secrecy laws on Eastern European states escaping from
oppressive Communism although in some cases secrecy
was opposed (Roberts 2003). Diplomatic and
international sensitivity is notorious. It can be seen in the
Court of First Instance in the EU which has given several
recent judgments interpreting very restrictively regulation
4(5) of the EU access Regulation (1049/2001): in
particular the IFAW decision ([2004] T-168/02)
concerning environmental documents passing from
Germany to the Commission and Germany’s request not
to disclose the documents. Under regulation 4(5) a
“member state may request the [EU] institution not to
disclose a document originating from that member state
without its prior agreement.” That “request” was a
determination and was final and conclusive, the CFI ruled
(also noteworthy is Mara Messina [2003] T-76/03). This
seems to go too far. The Council relies upon international
relations and security as the major reason to deny access to
documents under the Regulation.
The internationalisation of domestic law was
dramatically illustrated by the judgments in Pinochet
([1998] 4 All ER 897; [1999] 2 All ER 97 (HL)) even if
the final position adopted by the Law Lords was not as
epochal as their first aborted judgment. Those accused of
torture and war crimes while they were heads of state
increasingly face the prospect of domestic proceedings in
foreign jurisdictions. Internationally agreed standards are
having a direct impact in domestic legal systems. The UK’s
international relations are coloured by our membership of
the EU and ECHR. Domestic courts are bound by
decisions of the EU courts under sections 2 and 3
European Communities Act 1972 and they must have
regard to the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights
by virtue of the Human Rights Act, section 2. The power
of the former was seen conclusively in Johnstone v Chief
Constable RUC ([1986] 3 All ER 135). A ministerial
certificate seeking to prevent a tribunal dealing with an
allegation of sex discrimination in the RUC on the grounds
of public order/national security was overridden by the
ECJ because it denied access to justice – the first time such
a certificate enforcing closure for security had been
defeated.
The power of the Convention and the HRA have been
witnessed in case law concerning detention of alleged
combatants in Iraq by British forces and the holding of the
court (subject to appeal) of the extraterritoriality of the
HRA and its application to those detained by British forces
in Iraq (Al-Skeini [2005] 2 WLR 1401). This was followed
by a decision which examined the nature of rights under the
Convention as incorporated under the Human Rights Act.
Such rights are subject to superior norms of international
law – in this case UN Security Council Resolution 1546.
The antipathy of English law to rule by prerogative by the
Crown was aimed partly at the prevention of international
treaties (an act of prerogative) overriding the common law
and statute (for a classic abuse of prerogative power to
dispense with laws, see: Godden v Hales (1686) 11 St Tr 7





1165). We have witnessed the resort to international
norms to enhance the rights of individuals. What this case
represents is the spectre of international law concerning
occupying forces overriding the UK Human Rights Act and
its protection for British citizens (Al Jedda [2005] EWHC
1809 Admin). The solution adopted in the High Court
may be one of convenience because of the multi-national
nature of the occupying forces (and is subject to appeal)
but a contrary argument is that it is four hundred years too
late to non-suit the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep
74) and its ruling on the illegality of legislation by
prerogative to amend the general law.
4. IMPROPER USE OF PRIVACY
Privacy – or protection of private personal information
– is a human right. That is now a statement of British and
Northern Irish law (Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd
[2004] UKHL 22). It is an area in which the British judges
have been profoundly influenced by the jurisprudence of
the CHR. But we have to be careful that laws made or
developed to protect individual integrity are not abused to
make government “all inside and no outside”. The
problem arises when privacy is used unjustifiably to deny
access to information. For example, names cannot be
released of officials performing public duties, or payments
to officials, or actions involving officials, or of individuals
meeting officials because allegedly of Data Protection laws.
The position is not assisted by the complexity of DP
legislation and judicial interpretations of key terms (Durant
v Financial Services Authority [2004] EWCA Civ 1746).
The problem focuses upon the relationship between
access and secrecy in UK laws: the courts have engaged in
difficult balancing exercises in relation to the legitimate
requirements of respect for privacy and freedom of
expression of the press. But our laws on access and data
protection were drafted to give predominance to DP over
FoI in the FoIA section 72. The EU has also witnessed
difficulties in this area with refusals by the Commission to
give names in many circumstances. The EU Ombudsman
has criticised what he considered incorrect use of data
protection (see 2004 AR pp.45-46). In July 2005, a paper
from the European Data Protection Supervisor (Public
Access to Documents and Data Protection (July 2005)) criticised
unjustifiable resort to data protection to maintain secrecy
in public life. Data protection was about privacy protection
in private life.
There may be occasions when protection of identities
involving public duties is necessary for reasons eg of
personal safety. The UK Information Commissioner has
already made several decisions in this area. Several have
protected privacy for understandable reasons: protection
of informers’ identities, or the identities of officials where
there was no good reason to reveal identities (and
qualifications). But data has been released where it
involved payment of monies to a senior employee and
under FoIA details of individual payments under the CAP
have been allowed. The IC has used a judicious application
of Schedule 2 paragraph 6 Data Protection Act to
circumvent unjustified barriers. There is of course a proper
place for privacy protection. The proposed law on identity
cards is criticised for unnecessary expense and for being
the most centralised and extensive collection of personal
data ever seen in the UK – a regime that critics argue lacks
adequate safeguards for privacy.
5. COMMERCIAL SECRECY AND PUBLIC
INTEREST
There is an ever-greater reliance on contractual
arrangements for delivery of public services. Public
procurement laws from the EC have sought to instil greater
transparency in public purchasing. The FoIA may apply
directly to contractors who are designated by order where
they exercise functions of a public nature or who provide
under contract with a public authority (PA) “any service
whose provision is a function of that PA” (s 5(1)(a)(b)).
The Office of Government Commerce has provided
guidance on contracting and public purchasing and FoIA
requirements. FoIA is not silent on these issues. Section 43
exempts trade secrets or disclosure which would, or would
be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any
person (including the PA holding it). Section 41 protects
information provided in confidence where disclosure
would constitute an actionable breach of confidence. The
latter is an absolute exemption.
The law of confidentiality has its own public interest test
in disclosure which negates the duty of confidence. The
code of practice under FoIA section 45 provides advice and
guidance on confidentiality and this was watered down in
various stages of publication before it was approved by
Parliament. Confidentiality clauses, it originally advised,
should only be used “exceptionality”; now “PAs should
bear clearly in mind their obligations under the Act when
preparing to enter into contracts which may contain terms
relating to disclosure of information by them.” The Code
on EIRs is stronger and rather like the original section 45
draft.
There are obiter dicta to the effect that contractual
duties of confidence are stronger than equitable ones (AG v
Parry [2004] EMLR 13). Surely, confidentiality can only
protect that which is confidential and not information
which does not deserve to be identified as “confidential”.
Some useful guidance is given by Robert Walker LJ in LRT
v Mayor of London ([2003] EMLR 4). This case concerned
publication of criticism about a proposed Public Private
Partnership (PPP) arrangement on London Underground.
Attempts were made to use commercial confidentiality to
protect an interim report prepared by a firm of
accountants based on commercially confidential
information. This had been submitted by private sector
bidders subject to express confidentiality agreements.8
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‘The guiding principle is to preserve legitimate commercial
confidentiality while enabling the general public (and
especially the long-suffering travelling public of London) to be
informed of serious criticism from a serious source of the VFM
evaluation which is a crucial part of the PPP for the London
Underground.’ (Para 50)
In his supporting judgment, Sedley LJ stated that Art 10
ECHR concerning freedom of expression – which came
into play (and therefore s 12 HRA which seeks to prevent
gagging injunctions and see Cream Holdings [2004] UKHL
44) is not just about freedom of expression. “It is about the
right to receive and impart information .. the life-blood of
democracy” (para 55).
Third party challenge to PFI/PPP arrangements have
proved difficult – these are mostly negotiated and so fall
within the least demanding of transparency requirements
of procurement regulations. We have seen above how
private bodies may be designated as ‘public’. That brings us
to the enduring problem of the horizontality of public
power: a point that has arisen in judicial review and in
human rights litigation. The subject concerns the
appropriateness of binding private actors doing
government business to public law standards. If given too
much rein, commercial secrecy could blanket what are
really government duties owed to the public. Commercial
confidentiality and interest are exemptions that can lend
themselves to abuse. The watering down of the guidance
has been referred to. Without adequate supervision the
exemptions could prove particularly attractive as we move
to more government by contract or public private
partnerships. This was partly why the US government
sought approval of the Critical Infrastructure Information
provisions in the Homeland Security Act so that
information from private contractors would be excluded
from US FoIA.
6. ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
OPENNESS AS A HUMAN RIGHT
There is no provision within the ECHR on access to
information. There is a Recommendation of the Council of
Ministers from 2002(2) on access. The ECHR and HRA
have inspired interesting developments even if the decision
in Shayler ([2002] 2 All ER 477 (HL)) showed that section
1 Official Secrets Act 1989 providing absolute duties of
secrecy on security and intelligence officers is consistent
with Article 10. The important impact here has been the
decisions of the Court of Human Rights (CHR) on Articles
2 (right to life), 6 (fair and open trial), and 8 (right to
private and family life) in particular and how these have
been used to establish a right to information and
independent supervision of that right (Oneryildiz 39 EHRR
12; Edwards 12 BHRC 190; Gaskin 12 EHRR 36; Guerra 26
EHRR 357. The CHR has accepted that Article 10, which
guarantees a right to freedom of expression and to pass on
information, does not provide an access to information
right (McGinley 27 EHRR 1). The meaning of freedom of
expression will be tested in the Inter American Court on
Human Rights for the first time in relation to access to
information. Article 13 IACHR (a free speech provision)
has been invoked to provide an access right to state held
information. The litigation concerns a refusal by Chile to
provide information about inward investment and its
environmental impact. (Case 12.108 Claude Reyes et al v
Chile July 2005 www.justiceinitiative.org)
The jurisprudence of the CHR, and its limitations, have
obviously had their impact on domestic law. In Wagstaff
([2001] 1 WLR 292) the inquiry into the Shipley murders
had to be held in public after Article 10 was invoked. But
in Persey ([2003] QB 794) concerning the foot and mouth
inquiry Article 10 did not provide such a right. Wagstaff was
not followed in Howard ([2003] QB 830). Art 10 has also
been interpreted in England to provide a right not to be
prevented from speaking: it does not confer a right of
access to a broadcaster (R (Pro-Life Alliance) v BBC [2003] 2
All ER 977 (HL)). The Article 2 case law has shown a
judicial willingness to allow open inquiries after racist
murders in prison R (Amin) v Secretary of State [2003] 4 All
ER 1264 (HL) or fatalities following medical treatment (R
(Khan) v Secretary of State [2003] 4 All ER 1239). There is
also a substantial case law on how failure to provide
adequate reasons on the achievement of the objectives of
an inquest amounted to a breach of Article 2 (Birkinshaw
2005 para 9.147). This leads on to the next point:
I have argued elsewhere that FoI is a human right. Like
all human rights – and even now torture it seems – it is not
absolute. Our governors, despite piloting the HR Bill
through Parliament, do not take human rights seriously;
they are not seen as trumps for the weak and unpopular.
There have been heavy hints from the government on the
introduction of legislation to guide judges in the
interpretation of the substance of human rights and how
they should be weighed against the requirements of
national security. The EU Charter of Rights contained
guidance on the interpretation of the rights within the
Charter (to prevent some of them becoming “rights” once
they are made a legally binding part of the EU
Constitution). What is to be gained by declaring the right
to FoI as a fundamental right? Even within the constraints
imposed by the incorporation of the ECHR, the
acknowledgment of FoI as a human right would give the
balance to openness and access making them rights of
equal status to freedom of speech, the right to life, the right
to privacy. But how would this be achieved? A treaty on FoI
has been urged upon the Council of Europe:
<http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=1
02667>
Amendment of the Convention would appear
unavoidable, but at present an unlikely prospect. The
alternative would be common law recognition of such a
right. But would the courts abandon their reluctance to
assume the role of advocates of open government? An
examination of the case law shows that the courts have 9





already made a significant contribution to making
government more open.
7. INFORMATION AND LEGAL ARGUMENT
In litigation evidence is a central feature of litigation.
Evidence is information. Rules test its admissibility and
judicial guidance is given on reliability. The FoI culture is
having an impact on litigation. It falls to the
applicant/plaintiff/claimant to prove their case. Judicial
review is not a trial and there is an understandable
reluctance to make it such – it is a speedy process of
review. Judicial review changes in procedure were
introduced under Part 54 CPR (Birkinshaw 2005 chs 9 and
10); human rights litigation often involves questions of
necessity/proportionality; the arguments must be better
reasoned and more fully supported by authorities. More
evidence is required. Fair procedure allowing hearings is
being ever extended: see the House of Lords judgment on
the duty to hold an oral hearing involving a prisoner whose
licence is revoked (Regina v Parole Board ex parte Smith [2005]
UKHL 1). The law presses for this. It is producing conflict
between the judges and the government as the executive
claim their terrain is invaded. It is one of those reasons for
embarking on constitutionalism: fear of the many and fear
of the few.
The government fear is that of the few and unelected
judges judicialising the political process. Judges who are,
under the terms of governing legislation and in various
ways extending the concept of the polity. The latter is
another timeless feature of the route to constitutionalism:
what is the polity? HRA gives it a broad answer as does
FoIA.
The doctrine of proportionality has made a vital
difference. Its application or non application are often, but
not always, crucial for outcome: see for instance the R (Pro-
Life) v BBC case and the differing decisions of the Court of
Appeal and House of Lords ([2002] 2 All ER 756 and
[2003] UKHL 23). Proportionality is a vital factor where
human rights are engaged. Lord Steyn’s judgment in Daly
([2001] UKHL 26) is well known on this point but see
Sedley LJ in London Transport above. The balance of
competing rights (confidentiality and disclosure), he said:
Lies in the methodological concept of proportionality.
….Does the measure meet a recognised and pressing and
social need? Does it negate the primary right or restrict it
more than is necessary? Are the reasons given for it logical?
… for my part, I find it more helpful today to postulate a
recipient who, being reasonable, runs through the
proportionality checklist in order to anticipate what a court is
likely to decide, and who adjusts his or her conduct
accordingly. (paras 57–58)
What limits are placed on this process? The judges
themselves have resorted to the separation of powers. The
judges should not meddle in matters over which they have
no expertise. This is clearly illustrated by the decision in
Rehman ([2002] 1 All ER 122 (HL)). In Rehman the
appellant faced deportation because his presence in the UK
was deemed not conducive to the public good in the
interests of national security. He was accused of engaging in
various terrorist training activities aimed at overseas
countries. The appeals commission (SIAC) overruled the
Home Secretary on the grounds that he had asked the
wrong questions in determining national security – he had
made an error of jurisdictional fact. Furthermore ruled
SIAC, the Home Secretary had to be satisfied of
wrongdoing on a “high balance of probabilities”.
The real issue said Lord Hoffmann was not what
Rehman had done but on the basis of the case as a whole
whether the Home Secretary was entitled to consider that
R’s presence was a danger to national security. “In the
interests of national security” is not a straightforward
question of law – unlike “national security” – but an issue
of “judgment and policy” entrusted to the executive (para
50). It is artificial to separate national security from foreign
policy; the latter is clearly a matter for the executive. The
Home Secretary must have a factual basis for his
assessment but the Commission’s ability to differ must be
limited by the appellate function (para 54). The concept of
standard of proof is not appropriate – the question is not
whether something happened but the extent of a future
risk. “Each allegation cannot be taken seriatim and asked
whether it was established to some standard of proof. It is
a question of evaluation and judgment” (para 56).
SIAC, continued Hoffmann, is not the primary
decision-maker. The decision is entrusted to the Home
Secretary who “has the advantage of a wide range of advice
from people with day to day involvement in security
matters which the commission cannot match. It involves an
evaluation of risk .. to which the primary decision maker is
owed a wide margin of respect.” Basically, SIAC should not
interfere with a range of decisions at which the Home
Secretary may reasonably arrive (para 57). SIAC lacks the
expertise. But it does possess broad powers of appeal
including reversing a discretion of the Home Secretary.
The respect for the executive function was shown in the
Belmarsh decision (though strangely not by Lord
Hoffmann) when the majority ruled that the declaration of
a public emergency leading to a derogation from the
Convention was not unlawful. It was within the executive’s
(and legislature’s) margin of discretion and was pre-
eminently a “political judgment”. Courts had to respect
the “relative institutional competence” and recognise their
limits. Similar diffidence did not apply to the measures
taken to detain the suspected terrorists as we have seen
above or to rule on the inadmissibility of intelligence
extracted by torture in judicial proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Government constraint on information used to be not
unlike God’s prohibition on eating from the fruit of the
forbidden tree. Partake and there will be damnation and10
Amicus Curiae Issue 62 November/December 2005
11
Amicus Curiae Issue 62 November/December 2005
A
rticle
catastrophe. It was for our superiors to decide: was
disclosure “kind, wise and necessary”? The response was
limited. But the world has changed and erstwhile responses
and justifications are no longer adequate. New
justifications for secrecy, as well as for advancing the
democratic engagement have to be given. No-one can deny
that disclosure of information can be a terribly dangerous
thing – on informers’ identities; on access to scarce and
irreplaceable resources which will be pillaged for profit, on
security information to enemies of the state. The trouble is
in all the cases I examined above the decision on secrecy is
ultimately government’s. Challenge in sensitive areas is
difficult, if not impossible. Or a problem results from
indecision and failure by governments to act appropriately
in relation to FoI as in the international arena.
Governments often have an interest in not disclosing
information: sometimes selfish and corruption concealing;
more often for reasons of political expedience: to stay in
office; to have the advantage over political opponents. I
cannot help but think there is a continuum of that “crisis”
mentality that introduced the Official Secrets Act 1911 s.2
in our present frenetic activities concerning security. I am
conscious of the dreadful scenes that shocked the world
only yards from where this lecture was delivered and the
frightening spectre of suicide bombers who were British
born and bred and not a feature of frightening mayhem
from afar. But in the protection of our civil liberties and
human rights we still have to be very careful that political
overreaction does not place a wide national security
blanket over our newly emerging openness. We should also
seek to remove some of the deficiencies in the FoIA and
DPA. But at least we do have a FoIA. And I believe we are
better for that.
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